UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-26175-RAR

ADIDAS AG, *et al.*,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ATSOCCERJERSEY.COM,

Defendant.
_____/

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR DEFAULT FINAL JUDGMENT

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiffs' Motion for Entry of Default Final Judgment ("Motion"), [ECF No. 14]. Plaintiffs adidas AG, adidas International Marketing B.V., and adidas America, Inc. ("Plaintiffs") seek entry of a default final judgment against Defendant, atsoccerjersey.com a/k/a clubjerseygee.com a/k/a clubjerseyown.com a/k/a clubjerseyuu.com a/k/a crazyjersey.top a/k/a fcjersey.top a/k/a footballjersey.top a/k/a footballjerseyown.com a/k/a footballjerseypro.com a/k/a footballjerseyult.com a/k/a footballjerseywin.com a/k/a jerseyau.com a/k/a jerseyeugee.com a/k/a jerseygee.com a/k/a jerseyins.top a/k/a jerseykk.top a/k/a jerseyowo.top a/k/a jerseywell.top a/k/a jjersey.shop a/k/a johnjersey.shop a/k/a nkksoccer.com a/k/a nkksoccers.com a/k/a onejerseyshopowo.com a/k/a runjersey.shop a/k/a salejerseygee.com a/k/a salejerseys.top a/k/a salejerseywin.top a/k/a soccerowner.com a/k/a soccerstrue.com a/k/a usjersey.top a/k/a worldjerseyuu.com a/k/a worldsoccergee.com a/k/a worldsoccerkk.com a/k/a worldsoccerown.com a/k/a worldsoccerwin.com a/k/a worldxsoccer.com a/k/a xxjersey.shop a/k/a zjersey.shop ("Defendant"), that operates Internet based e-commerce stores that infringe Plaintiffs' trademarks and promote and sell counterfeit goods bearing and/or using Plaintiffs' trademarks. *See generally* Mot. Plaintiffs request that the Court: (1) enjoin Defendant from producing or selling

goods and services that infringe on their trademarks; (2) cancel, or at Plaintiffs' election, transfer the Internet based e-commerce stores operating under Defendant's seller names ("E-commerce Store Names") at issue to Plaintiffs; (3) assign all rights, title, and interest to the E-commerce Store Names to Plaintiffs; (4) permanently delist or deindex the E-commerce Store Names from all internet search engines; (5) authorize Plaintiffs to request any e-mail service provider permanently suspend the e-mail addresses which are or have been used by Defendant in connection with Defendant's promotion, offering for sale, and/or sale of goods using counterfeits and infringements of Plaintiffs' trademarks; (6) require Defendant to request in writing permanent termination of any messaging services and E-commerce Store Names it owns, operates, or controls; and (7) award statutory damages. *See generally id.*

A Clerk's Default, [ECF No. 13], was entered against Defendant on February 24, 2026, after Defendant failed to respond to the Complaint, [ECF No. 1], despite having been served. *See* Proof of Service, [ECF No. 9]. The Court having considered the record and noting no opposition to the Motion, it is hereby



ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Motion, [ECF No. 14], is **GRANTED** for the reasons stated herein.


BACKGROUND[1]

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs are the owner of the following trademarks, which are valid and registered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (collectively, the "adidas Marks"):

[1] The factual background is taken from Plaintiffs' Complaint, [ECF No. 1], the Motion, [ECF No. 14], and supporting evidentiary submissions.

Trademark	Registration Number	Registration Date	Class / Goods
ADIDAS	0,891,222	May 19, 1970	IC25. sport shoes namely, track and field shoes, baseball, boxing, football, skating, golf, and soccer shoes; sportswear namely, suits, shorts, pants, tights, shirts, gloves, and the like; jerseys; socks; sport shoes namely, track and field training shoes, basketball shoes, and tennis shoes.
	0,973,161	November 20, 1973	IC 018. tote bags. IC 25. specific purpose athletic shoes; general purpose sport shoes, sportswear-namely, suits, shorts, pants, tights, shirts, jerseys, socks, and gloves.
adidas	1,300,627	October 16, 1984	IC 025. Sportswear-Namely, Suits, Shorts, Pants, Tights, Shirts, Jerseys, Socks, Gloves, Jackets, Coats, Swimwear, Sweaters, Caps, Pullovers, Warm-Up Suits, Boots, Shoes, Slippers.
	1,310,140	December 18, 1984	IC 025. Sportswear-Namely, Suits, Shorts, Pants, Tights, Shirts, Jerseys, Socks, Gloves, Jackets, Coats, Swimwear, Sweaters, Caps, Pullovers, Warm-Up Suits, Rain Suits, Ski Suits, Jump Suits, Boots, Shoes, Slippers.
	2,058,619	May 6, 1997	IC 025. Sports and leisure wear, namely shirts
	2,179,796	August 11, 1998	IC 025. sports and leisure wear, namely shorts, pants, shirts, T-shirts, jerseys, tights, socks, gloves, jackets, swimwear, sweaters, caps and hats, pullovers, warm-up suits, rain-suits, ski suits, jump suits, boots, slippers, sandals, specific purpose athletic shoes, and general purpose sport shoes.
	2,284,308	October 12, 1999	IC 025. sports and leisure wear, namely pants.

	2,278,591	September 21, 1999	IC 25. sports and leisure wear, namely, shorts.
	2,411,802	December 12, 2000	IC 018. All purpose sport bags, athletic bags, traveling bags, backpacks, knapsacks. IC 025. Sports and leisure wear, namely, shorts, pants, shirts, T-shirts, jerseys, socks, gloves, jackets, swimwear, caps and hats, pullovers, sweat-shirts, sweat suits, track suits, warm-up suits; boots, sandals, specific purpose athletic shoes and general all purpose sports shoes. IC 028. Sports balls and playground balls; guards for athletic use, namely, shin guards, knee guards and leg guards.
	3,029,127	December 13, 2005	IC 025. Clothing, namely, T-Shirts, sweatshirts, jackets and coats.

	3,104,117	June 13, 2006	IC 009. Optical apparatus and instruments, namely, eyeglasses and sunglasses. IC 014. Horological and chronometric instruments, namely, watches IC 018. Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made from these materials in the nature of bags for general and sport use, namely, handbags, tote bags, waist packs, overnight bags, backpacks, knapsacks and beach bags; trunks; traveling bags for general and sport use; leather and imitations of leather and goods made from these materials, namely, wallets, briefcases. IC 025. Sports and leisure wear, namely suits, shorts, pants, sweatpants, skirts, skorts, dresses, blouses, shirts, T-shirts, sleeveless tops, polo shirts, vests, jerseys, sweaters, sweatshirts, pullovers, coats, jackets, track suits, training suits, warm-up suits, swimwear, underwear, socks, gloves, scarves, wristbands and belts; headgear, namely caps, hats, visors, headbands; athletic footwear and leisure foot wear, namely boots, sandals, specific purpose athletic shoes and general purpose sports shoes.

	4,910,643	March 6, 2016	IC 018. Articles made of leather and imitation leather, namely, backpacks, bags for general and sports use, carry-all bags, athletic bags, duffle bags, shoulder bags, sling bags, handbags, purses, tote bags, waist packs, overnight bags, knapsacks, shoe bags. IC 025. Clothing, namely, shirts, T-shirts, sweatshirts, jerseys, pullovers, tops, sweaters, pants, shorts, bottoms, jackets, coats, dresses, skirts, skorts, underwear, bras, socks, tights, scarves, gloves, belts, tracksuits, training suits, warm-up suits, athletic uniforms, swimwear, footwear, athletic footwear, boots, sandals, slides, caps, hats, visors, headbands. IC 028. Athletic sporting goods, namely, shinguards, soccer gloves, goalkeepers' gloves, leg guards; Balls for sports, soccer balls, basketballs, playground balls.

See Decl. of Amanda Luz ("Luz Decl."), [ECF No. 14-1] ¶¶ 4–5. The adidas Marks are registered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office and are used in connection with the design, manufacture, and distribution of quality goods in the categories identified above. *See id*.

Plaintiffs' representative reviewed and visually inspected the detailed web page captures and images of the various branded products offered for sale by Defendant via its Internet based e-commerce stores operating under its seller names (the "E-commerce Store Names") and determined the products were non-genuine, unauthorized versions of Plaintiffs' branded product. *See* Luz Decl. ¶¶ 14–15; Luz Decl. Ex. 1, [ECF No. 14-2]. Based on their investigation, Plaintiffs allege Defendant has advertised, promoted, offered for sale, or sold goods using what Plaintiffs have determined to be counterfeits, infringements, reproductions, or colorable imitations of the adidas Marks. *See* Luz Decl. ¶¶ 13–15; *see also* Compl. ¶¶ 10–16, 26. Defendant is not now, nor has it ever been, authorized

or licensed to use, reproduce, or make counterfeits, reproductions, or colorable imitations of the adidas Marks. *See* Luz Decl. ¶¶ 13-15.

B. Procedural Background

On December 31, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their Complaint, [ECF No. 1], against Defendant. On January 16, 2026, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Order Authorizing Alternate Service of Process ("Motion for Alternate Service"), [ECF No. 5]. The Court entered an Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Order Authorizing Alternate Service of Process on January 21, 2026, [ECF No. 6]. In accordance with the January 21, 2026 Order, Plaintiffs served Defendant with a summons and a copy of the Complaint via electronic mail and website posting on January 30, 2026. *See* Decl. of Virgilio Gigante ("Gigante Decl."), [ECF No. 14-3] ¶ 5; *see also* [ECF No. 9].

Defendant failed to file an answer or other response, and the time allowed for Defendant to respond to the Complaint has since expired. *See* Gigante Decl. ¶¶ 6–7. To Plaintiffs' knowledge, Defendant is not an infant or incompetent person, and the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act does not apply. *See id*. ¶ 8. On February 24, 2026, the Clerk entered Default against Defendant, [ECF No. 13], for failure to plead or otherwise defend pursuant to Rule 55(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs now move the Court for default final judgment against Defendant.

LEGAL STANDARD

A party may apply to the court for a default judgment when the defendant fails to timely respond to a pleading. FED. R. CIV. P. 55(b)(2). "A 'defendant, by his default, admits the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.'" *Eagle Hosp. Physicians, LLC v. SRG Consulting, Inc.*, 561 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting *Nishimatsu Const. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank*, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). However, conclusions of law are to be determined by the

court. *See Mierzwicki v. CAB Asset Management LLC*, No. 14-CV-61998, 2014 WL 12488533, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2014). Therefore, a court may only enter a default judgment if there is a "sufficient basis to state a claim." *Id.* (citing *Nishimatsu*, 515 F.2d at 1206).

Once a plaintiff has established a sufficient basis for liability, the Court must conduct an inquiry to determine the appropriate damages. *PetMed Express, Inc. v. MedPets.Com, Inc.*, 336 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1217 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citation omitted). Although an evidentiary hearing is generally required, the Court need not conduct such a hearing "when . . . additional evidence would be truly unnecessary to a fully informed determination of damages." *Safari Programs, Inc. v. CollectA Int'l Ltd.*, 686 F. App'x 737, 746 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting *SEC v. Smyth*, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, where the record adequately supports the award of damages, an evidentiary hearing is not required. *See Smyth,* 420 F.3d at 1232 n.13; *PetMed Express, Inc.*, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (finding an evidentiary hearing unnecessary because plaintiff was seeking statutory damages under the Lanham Act); *Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. v. Casa Los Martnez Corp.*, No. 14-CV-22859, 2014 WL 4948632, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2014) (same).

ANALYSIS

A. Claims

Plaintiffs seek a default judgment for the relief sought in the Complaint, asserting the following claims against Defendant: (1) trademark counterfeiting and infringement under section 32 of the Lanham Act, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1114 ("Claim 1"); (2) false designation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) ("Claim 2"); (3) unfair competition under Florida common law ("Claim 3"); and (4) trademark infringement under Florida common law ("Claim 4"). *See* Compl. ¶¶ 38–63.

1. Counterfeiting and Infringement

Section 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114, provides liability for trademark infringement if, without the consent of the registrant, a defendant uses "in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark . . . which . . . is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a). To prevail on its trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) that it had prior rights to the mark at issue and (2) that the defendant had adopted a mark or name that was the same, or confusingly similar to its mark, such that consumers were likely to confuse the two." *Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techsplosion, Inc.*, 261 F.3d 1188, 1193 (11th Cir. 2001) (footnote and citations omitted).

2. False Designation of Origin

The test for liability for false designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) is the same as for a trademark counterfeiting and infringement claim—*i.e.*, whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks at issue. *See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,* 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

3. Common Law Unfair Competition

Whether a defendant's use of a plaintiff's trademarks created a likelihood of confusion between the plaintiff's and the defendant's products is also the determining factor in the analysis of unfair competition under the common law of Florida. *See Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Forrester*, No. 83-CV-8381, 1986 WL 15668, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 9, 1986) ("[I]t is clear that the Court need not find 'actual confusion[.]' . . . The proper test is 'likelihood of confusion[.]'").

4. Common Law Trademark Infringement

The analysis of liability for Florida common law trademark infringement is the same as the analysis of liability for trademark infringement under section 32(a) of the Lanham Act. *See PetMed Express, Inc.*, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1217–18.

B. Liability

The well-pleaded factual allegations of Plaintiffs' Complaint properly contain the elements for each of the above claims and are admitted by virtue of Defendant's defaults. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 10–16, 26–34, 39–43, 46–51, 54–56, 59–62. Moreover, the Complaint's factual allegations have been substantiated by sworn declarations and other evidence and establish Defendant's liability for each of the claims asserted. Accordingly, default judgment pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is appropriately entered against Defendant.

C. Relief

Plaintiffs request an award of equitable relief and monetary damages against Defendant for trademark infringement in Claim 1. The Court analyzes Plaintiffs' request for relief as to Claim 1 only, as the judgment for Claims 2, 3, and 4—false designation of origin, common law unfair competition, and common law trademark infringement—is limited to entry of the requested equitable relief for Claim 1. *See generally* Mot.

1. Injunctive Relief

Pursuant to the Lanham Act, a district court is authorized to issue an injunction "according to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the court may deem reasonable," to prevent violations of trademark law. 15 U.S.C. § 1116(a). Indeed, "[i]njunctive relief is the remedy of choice for trademark and unfair competition cases, since there is no adequate remedy at law for the injury caused by a defendant's continuing infringement." *Burger King Corp. v. Agad*, 911 F. Supp.

1499, 1509–10 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Sandlin*, 846 F.2d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1988)). Injunctive relief is available even in the default judgment setting, *see e.g., PetMed Express, Inc.*, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1222–23, because Defendant's failure to respond or otherwise appear makes it difficult for a plaintiff to prevent further infringement absent an injunction. *See Jackson v. Sturkie*, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1103 (N.D. Cal. 2003) ("[D]efendant's lack of participation in this litigation has given the court no assurance that defendant's infringing activity will cease. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to permanent injunctive relief.").

Permanent injunctive relief is appropriate where a plaintiff demonstrates: (1) it has suffered irreparable injury; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; (3) the balance of hardship favors an equitable remedy; and (4) an issuance of an injunction is in the public's interest. *See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC*, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). Plaintiffs have carried their burden on each of the four factors.

Specifically, in trademark cases, "a sufficiently strong showing of likelihood of confusion [caused by trademark infringement] may by itself constitute a showing of . . . a substantial threat of irreparable harm." *E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A. v. Shaw-Ross Int'l Imp., Inc.*, 756 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted); *see also Levi Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int'l Trading Inc*., 51 F.3d 982, 986 (11th Cir. 1995) ("There is no doubt that the continued sale of thousands of pairs of counterfeit jeans would damage [the plaintiff's] business reputation and decrease its legitimate sales."). Plaintiffs' Complaint and the submissions show that the goods produced, offered for sale, and/or sold by Defendant via its e-commerce stores use identical copies of Plaintiffs' trademarks, and consumers viewing Defendant's e-commerce stores and goods are likely to confuse them for Plaintiffs' genuine products. *See e.g.*, Compl. ¶ 27 ("Defendant's actions are likely to cause

confusion of consumers at the time of initial interest, sale, and in the post-sale setting, who will believe Defendant's goods are genuine goods originating from, associated with, and/or approved by Plaintiffs.").

Plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law so long as Defendant continues to operate the E-commerce Store Names because Plaintiffs cannot control how their trademarks are presented to consumers in the marketplace. An award of monetary damages alone will not cure the injury to Plaintiffs' reputations and goodwill if Defendant's infringing and counterfeiting continue. Moreover, Plaintiffs face hardship from loss of sales and their inability to control their reputations in the marketplace. By contrast, Defendant faces no hardship if it is prohibited from the infringement of Plaintiffs' trademarks. Finally, the public interest supports the issuance of a permanent injunction against Defendant to prevent consumers from being misled by Defendant's products and potentially harmed by their inferior quality. *See Chanel, Inc. v. besumart.com,* 240 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2016) ("[A]n injunction to enjoin infringing behavior serves the public interest in protecting consumers from such behavior." (citation omitted)); *World Wrestling Ent., Inc. v. Thomas*, No. 12-CIV-21018, 2012 WL 12874190, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2012) (considering the potential for harm based on exposure to potentially hazardous counterfeit merchandise in analyzing public's interest in an injunction).

Broad equity powers allow the Court to fashion injunctive relief necessary to stop Defendant's infringing activities. *See e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,* 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies. The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould [sic] each decree to the necessities of the particular case." (citation modified)); *United States v.*

Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 724 (1944) ("Equity has power to eradicate the evils of a condemned scheme by prohibition of the use of admittedly valid parts of an invalid whole." (citations omitted)).

Defendant has created an Internet-based counterfeiting scheme in which it is profiting from its deliberate misappropriation of Plaintiffs' rights. Accordingly, the Court may fashion injunctive relief to eliminate the means by which Defendant is conducting its unlawful activities. Appropriate remedies to achieve this end include canceling or transferring the E-commerce Store Names; assigning all rights, title, and interest to the E-commerce Store Names to Plaintiffs; delisting or de-indexing the E-commerce Store Names from any Internet search engine; suspending the e-mail addresses used by Defendant; and terminating any messaging service accounts Defendant owns, operates, or controls, such that these means may no longer be used as instrumentalities to further the sale of counterfeit goods.

2. Statutory Damages

In a case involving the use of counterfeit marks in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) provides that a plaintiff may elect an award of statutory damages at any time before final judgment is rendered in the sum of not less than $1,000.00 nor more than $200,000.00 per counterfeit mark per type of good. *See* 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(1). In addition, if the Court finds Defendant's counterfeiting actions were willful, it may impose damages above the maximum limit up to $2,000,000.00 per counterfeit mark per type of good. *See id.* § 1117(c)(2).

The Court has wide discretion to determine the amount of statutory damages. *See PetMed Express, Inc.*, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1219 (citing *Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prods., Inc.*, 902 F.2d 829, 852 (11th Cir. 1990)). An award of statutory damages is appropriate despite a

plaintiff's inability to prove actual damages caused by a defendant's infringement. *See Ford Motor Co. v. Cross*, 441 F. Supp. 2d 837, 852 (E.D. Mich. 2006); *Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Universal Tel-A-Talk, Inc.*, No. 96-CV-6961, 1998 WL 767440, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 1998) (awarding statutory damages where plaintiff failed to prove actual damages or profits). The option of a statutory damages remedy in trademark counterfeiting cases is sensible given evidence of a defendant's profits in such cases is frequently almost impossible to ascertain. *See e.g.,* S. Rep. No. 104-177, pt. V § 7 (1995) (discussing purposes of Lanham Act statutory damages); *PetMed Express, Inc.*, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 (statutory damages are "[e]specially appropriate in default judgment cases due to infringer nondisclosure" (citations omitted)). This case is no exception.

Here, the allegations of the Complaint and the evidence establish that Defendant intentionally copied one or more of the adidas Marks for the purpose of deriving the benefit of Plaintiffs' world-famous reputations. Defendant has defaulted on Plaintiffs' allegations of willfulness. *See* Compl. ¶ 33; *see also Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker Enters., Inc.*, 298 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding a court may infer willfulness from the defendants' default) (citations omitted); *PetMed Express, Inc.*, 336 F. Supp. 2d at 1217 (stating that upon default, well-pleaded allegations are taken as true). As such, the Lanham Act permits the Court to award up to $2,000,000.00 per infringing mark on each type of good as statutory damages to ensure Defendant does not continue its intentional and willful counterfeiting activities.

The only available evidence demonstrates that Defendant used at least one (1) mark which is a counterfeit of at least one of the adidas Marks protected by federal trademark registrations, in connection with the promotion, distribution, advertisement, offer for sale, and/or sale of at least one (1) type of good. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 18, 26–28, 39–41; Luz Decl. ¶¶ 5, 14–15; Luz Decl. Ex. 1, [ECF No. 14-2]. Based on the above considerations, Plaintiffs have asked the Court to award

statutory damages in the amount of $1,000,000.00 per mark, per type of good. *See* Mot. 17–18. As Defendant used at least one counterfeit mark on one type of good, Plaintiffs request a statutory damages award in the amount of $1,000,000.00 against Defendant. *See id*. The award should be sufficient to deter Defendant and others from continuing to counterfeit or otherwise infringe Plaintiffs' trademarks, compensate Plaintiffs, and punish Defendant, all stated goals of 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c). The Court finds that this award of statutory damages falls within the permissible range under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(c) and is just. *See Yeti Coolers, LLC v. Individuals, Bus. Entities, & Unincorporated Ass'ns*, No. 25-23363 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2025), ECF No. 42 (awarding the plaintiff $1,000,000.00 against each defendant based on at least one trademark counterfeited on one type of good); *Chanel, Inc. v. Individuals, Bus. Entities, & Unincorporated Ass'ns*, No. 25-23655 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 22, 2025), ECF No. 37 (awarding the plaintiff $1,000,000.00 against each defendant based on at least one trademark counterfeited on one type of good); *Fed'n of the Swiss Watch Indus. FH v. Individuals, Bus. Entities, & Unincorporated Ass'ns*, No. 25-22677 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2025), ECF No. 44 (awarding the plaintiff $1,000,000.00 against each defendant based on at least one trademark counterfeited on one type of good); *Chanel, Inc. v. Individuals, Bus. Entities, & Unincorporated Ass'ns*, No. 25-21839 (S.D. Fla. July 14, 2025), ECF No. 45 (awarding plaintiff $1,000,000.00 against each defendant based on at least two marks counterfeited on one type of good); *Yeti Coolers, LLC v. Individuals, Bus. Entities, & Unincorporated Ass'ns*, No. 24-24499 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2025), ECF No. 39 (awarding plaintiff $1,000,000.00 against each defendant per mark counterfeited per type of good).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs are entitled to the entry of default final judgment. Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs' Motion, [ECF No. 14], is **GRANTED**. Default final judgment and a permanent injunction shall be entered by separate order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, this 23rd day of March, 2026.

RODOLFO A. RUIZ II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE